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Why Does Controversy Persist? Paradigm Clash,
Conflicting Visions, and Academic Productivity in the
Aesthetics of Religion
Mareike Smolka
Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences, University Maastricht, Maastricht, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
The genre of controversy studies in Science & Technology
Studies distinguishes between ‘internalist’ and ‘interactional’
controversies. Interactional controversy studies highlight that
debates involving multiple stakeholders with competing
interests often evade closure. Research on internalist
controversies focuses on how a ‘core-set’ of experts manages
to resolve arguments about knowledge claims. Yet, internalist
controversies do not always reach closure; dissent may persist
while scientific work continues. A controversy within the
German research network AESToR has persisted for several
years, with periodic outbreaks and without impinging on
academic productivity. AESToR pioneers the aesthetics of
religion in religious studies; members have debated how to
relate cognitive with cultural approaches to the study of
religion. Three analytical perspectives – paradigm clash,
conflicting visions, and productivity – explain why controversy
persists in AESToR. Controversy is fuelled by conflicting
visions of connectivity, competence, and ethics. These visions
are informed by and give rise to a clash between paradigms:
Kulturwissenschaft and Naturwissenschaft. The controversy
persists because there are conflicts between views about
epistemology, morality, and the future of the aesthetics of
religion. Moreover, keeping the controversy alive stimulates
productivity in terms of academic output and epistemological
pluralism. Rather than closing the debate, participants have a








In November 2017, I observed an outbreak of controversy during a workshop
organised by the early-career research network AESToR to work on The
Bloomsbury Handbook of Cognitive and Cultural Aesthetics of Religion. The
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title of the handbook sparked discussions among AESToR members, as illus-
trated by the following excerpt from my field notes of the event:
A: I am shocked about the proposal for the handbook title. I am afraid that peer-
reviewers say that the chapters do not live up to the title’s promise.
B: Are there scholars in AESToR who think that ‘cognitive’ and ‘cultural’ work
together and can make a case for it?
C: I work with cognitive theory.
D: It is a good title because it connects anthropology of the senses with recent
developments in the study of sensory perception in the cognitive sciences. Reli-
gious studies scholars need to be in conversation with new approaches to the
sensing subject! We have to engage with literature from the cognitive science
of religion.
E: We should not go into a new field for the handbook. We should build on what
we have done and position ourselves constructively.
A: I argue against the cognitive approach in my handbook contribution. I feel more
at ease with the cultural approach.
The discussion about the handbook title reflects a broader controversy over the
relation between the aesthetics of religion and the cognitive science of religion.
The aesthetics of religion, which originated as an academic field in the huma-
nities in Germany in the 1980s, studies sensory perception of religious practices
and experiences. Its pioneers founded the AESToR network and received
funding from the German Research Fund between 2015 and 2018 to solidify
and internationalise the field. AESToR members pursue a cultural approach
to the study of religion which encompasses historical, literary, and ethno-
graphic inquiries. However, some of them consider it the task of the aesthetics
of religion ‘to bridge the gap between cognitive and cultural approaches to reli-
gion’ (www.aestor.net). The cognitive approach emerged in the cognitive
science of religion (CSR), a young academic field with institutional roots in
Europe and Northern America devoted to the study of religion on the basis
of theories and methods from the cognitive sciences.
The controversy over the relation between the aesthetics of religion and CSR
has persisted for years, including periodic outbreaks. In September 2019, I wit-
nessed an outbreak which had started shortly before the 33rd Biannual Confer-
ence of the German Association for the Study of Religion (DVRW).
Controversy surrounded AESToR’s panel ‘Aesthetics. Materiality. Cognition.
– Where should we go in conceptualizing religion?,’ which aimed to open dis-
cussions on questions such as: ‘How will we position ourselves towards the
nasty ditch with natural scientific axioms in CSR?’ (Koch and Guggenmos,
2019a). The panel abstract, which also served as a call for panel contributions,
seemed to be an open invitation to continue the controversy.
This observation is unusual in light of the ‘internalist’ (Jasanoff, 2017, p. 269)
sub-genre of controversy studies in Science & Technology Studies (STS).
Internalist controversy studies trace debates about knowledge claims,
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observational evidence, and methodologies within a demarcated ‘core-set’ of
experts (Collins, 1981). A core-set is composed of scientists who study the
same topic, but who have weak social relations because they disagree on
matters of fact and method. It is a ‘transient hot-spot in science’ (p. 12)
which dies down as soon as one view has come to prevail. From within the
core-set emerges a ‘core-group’ (Collins, 2000, p. 825). Members of the core-
group have stronger social ties because they have a unified objective and
agree on a dominant view – a condition for social cohesion according to
Collins (Lynch, 2002, citing Collins, 1983).
Although the controversy in AESToR takes place within a well-demarcated
set of academics, it differs from internalist controversies in science. AESToR
resembles a core-group because members form a cohesive group with a
shared goal: to promote the aesthetics of religion. Some of them have developed
solidaristic relations since 2007, when the self-funded German working group
Arbeitskreis Religionsästhetik was established (Wilke, 2008) which later trans-
formed into AESToR. Against this backdrop, it is surprising that AESToR
has gone through periodic outbreaks of controversy and that members seek
to fuel debate instead of making efforts to close it (Collins, 1981; Pinch,
1981; Edmond, 2001).
A reason for the persistence of controversy in this case may pertain to its
being situated at the intersection of the humanities and the cognitive sciences.
Internalist controversy studies have mainly focused on the natural sciences
(Shapin and Schaffer, 1985; Collins and Pinch, 1998) and more applied sciences,
such as engineering (Bijker, 1995) and medicine (Lehoux et al., 2010). Scholars
have rarely paid attention to controversies in the arts (Versteegh, 2009), social
sciences (Gieryn, 1999), and humanities (Kaltenbrunner, 2015). Kaltenbrunner
argues that looking beyond the natural sciences opens up different dynamics in
controversies. He traces a controversy around a digital innovation of a biblio-
graphical tool for Dutch literary studies – a ‘clash between different ways of
defining an area of scholarly inquiry, occasioned by an overarching discourse
of the “encounter” between the humanities and digital technology’ (p. 29).
Similarly, Panofsky (2015) demonstrates how controversy has restructured
behaviour genetics, a field sitting uncomfortably between the natural and the
social sciences. He proposes reasons for the persistence of controversy.
Inspired by Panofsky, this article explains why controversy over the relation
between cultural and cognitive approaches to the study of religion endured in
AESToR. It identifies three reasons for the persistence of controversy: paradigm
clash, conflicting visions, and productivity. After rooting these concepts in the
philosophy of science, the sociology of expectations, and STS, I elaborate on
the methods employed to study the controversy. The empirical analysis
shows how controversy is reproduced in three ways: (1) in the opposition
between Kulturwissenschaft and Naturwissenschaft, (2) in conflicting visions
of connectivity, competence, and ethics concerning the relation between the
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aesthetics of religion and CSR, and (3) in productive engagements with contro-
versy that result in academic output and epistemological pluralism. This analy-
sis underlines that internalist controversies in the humanities must not be
considered as bounded, ephemeral phenomena. As such it sheds light on the
social dynamics that promote controversy while organising the humanities
around the cognition-culture divide.
Analytical Perspectives
Several authors have surveyed the long history in STS of studying scientific and
technological controversies (Sismondo, 2010; Pinch, 2015; Jasanoff, 2017). They
make a distinction between what Jasanoff calls ‘internalist’ and ‘interactional’
controversies (p. 269). While internalist controversies are fought at research
frontiers among a delineated group of experts, interactional controversies
involve society.1 The study of interactional controversies dates back to the
1960s when technological developments like nuclear power and petrochemistry
sparked societal debates. Nelkin (1992), who pioneered this genre, recognises
that few of these debates are ever resolved. They often persist for decades or
recur in changing forms and places because they involve competing political
interests and moral norms.2
Internalist controversies, by contrast, are usually characterised as instable,
intermittent periods that the experts involved try to overcome swiftly. Since
the late 1970s, the sociology of scientific knowledge has examined how contro-
versies about knowledge claims end and how social order is produced (Collins,
1985; Shapin and Schaffer, 1985). This approach has been taken up to study
how the meaning of technologies stabilises (Pinch and Bijker, 1987; Bijker,
1995), as well as how sets of social, cognitive, and material relationships are
fixed in black boxes (Latour, 1987). Scholars involved in the Hastings
Center’s Closure Project dedicated four years to developing case studies and
typologies of the ways in which scientific controversies come to be regarded
as having reached ‘closure,’ ‘resolution,’ or ‘termination’ (Engelhardt and
Caplan, 1987). However, Mendelsohn (Williams, 2019, citing Mendelsohn,
1987, p. 101), one of the contributors, acknowledges that
resolution is by no means always found…On the contrary it appears that scientific
work is able to continue and that the knowledge and explanatory modes used by
both parties of a conflict become a part of the broad body of knowledge and technique
in the sciences and can be, and often are, used even while disagreement persists.
Several controversy studies that focus on disputes among experts have indicated
that controversies persist over time, re-open, or recur in new contexts. Williams
(2019) analyses an ongoing controversy over rival technologies and operating
techniques for eradicating blindness. Rosen (1993) observes that the mountain
bike’s design, rather than having stabilised, remained open to (user-
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)interpretation and flexibility. Controversies among members of a core-set have
been shown to give rise to ‘life after death’ of ‘rejected science’ (Collins, 2000,
p. 824; Simon, 2002), or to evade closure for longer than a decade (MacKenzie
and Barnes, 1975; Pinch, 1981; Segerstråle, 1986).
Whereas these controversy studies merely touch upon reasons for the per-
sistence of controversy, Panofsky (2015, p. 9) wrote a book on what he calls
‘misbehaving science’:
Controversies wax and wane, sometimes they emerge explosively, but they never
really resolve and always threaten to reappear… If science is like a machine for resol-
ving controversies, in misbehaving science that machine is broken.
Drawing on Bourdieu’s field theory, he analyses ‘how controversy has shaped
the development of behavior genetics’ while also explaining why ‘controversy
has been so persistent’ (Panofsky, 2015, p. 11). Reasons for the persistence of
controversy include, among others, a paradigm clash, conflicting visions, and
productivity. Combining these concepts helps making sense of controversy in
AESToR because they allow me to explain why members of a core-group
choose to sustain alternative paradigms. To build on Panofsky’s historical
account, I develop these concepts theoretically and apply them to a controversy
in situ.
Paradigm Clash
It is a widely held view among scholars, in particular in the philosophy of
science, that controversies can be the product of metatheoretical disagreement.
According to McMullin’s (1987) classification of controversies, ‘controversy of
principle’ (p. 71) is difficult to resolve: ‘Such principles may be either methodo-
logical, bearing on the procedures and criteria of science, or ontological, having
to do with the basic categories and forms in terms of which we schematize the
natural world’ (p. 73, emphasis in original). He introduces the controversy over
the adequacy of Newton’s notion of force as an example of a controversy of
principle that ‘even after three centuries is not quite over’ (p. 73) because it res-
urfaces in debates surrounding the theory of relativity. He adds the Aristote-
lian-Galilean debate on planetary motion as another prime example, which is
also known as a clash of Kuhn’s (1992[1962]) ‘paradigms.’
Similar to Kuhnian paradigms are Fleck’s (1935) ‘thought styles,’ Laudan’s
(1977) ‘research traditions,’ or Rheinberger’s (1994) ‘experimental systems.’
These concepts cannot be used interchangeably, but all of them have explana-
tory potential for the relation between metatheoretical disagreement and con-
troversy. Rheinberger, for instance, defines ‘experimental systems’ as ‘basic,
functional units of scientific activity’ (p. 67). Experimental systems enable a
closer look at the micro-dynamics of scientific activity, the heterogeneity of
which in a particular field challenges Kuhn’s idea of a paradigm’s coherence
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as coordinating the activity of a whole scientific community. Hagner and
Rheinberger (1998) suggest that ‘an analysis of how different experimental
systems interact – how they overlap, and how they delimit, exclude, or sup-
plement each other – should provide insight into the developmental dynamics
of broader fields of science’ (p. 359). An analysis of how experimental systems
exclude each other is informed by Kuhn’s (1992[1962]) concept of ‘incommen-
surability of competing paradigms’ (p. 348), i.e. mutual incomprehensibility
between proponents of different theories.
Drawing on Kuhn, philosophers argue that conceptual issues ‘help explain
the persistent tendency of advocates and critics of traditional behavioural gen-
etics to talk past another’ (Griffiths and Tabery, 2008, p. 344). Competing para-
digms are presented as the source of miscommunication in the old ‘nature-
nurture controversy’ (Pastore, 1949). Panofsky (2015) agrees that paradigms
‘matter, certainly, but their effects are mediated by field-level structures’
(p. 191). An academic field can provide ‘an intellectual big tent that houses
an array of competing paradigms’ (p. 28). An example of such a ‘big tent’ is reli-
gious studies, a multi-disciplinary field where scholars are used to theoretical
and methodological pluralism (Stausberg and Engler, 2011). Although
conflicts between paradigms may be conducive to nurturing controversy, its
prospering depends on social dynamics.
Conflicting Visions
The relation between a paradigm clash and academic debates can be turned
upside down by examining the social dynamics that make paradigms conflict,
integrate, or coexist peacefully. For example, Panofsky (2015, p. 105) contradicts
the common notion that animal and human researchers are working with incompa-
tible “experimental systems,” and that the controversy would be determined by these
systems’ capacities and the questions asked. I show that the causation is opposite:
different visions of the field imagine different relationships between experimental
systems and deem different questions worth asking.
Whereas animal researchers envisioned behaviour genetics as the common
pursuit of an intrinsic interest in understanding behaviour genetically,
human researchers considered behaviour genetics as a portable set of tools
for solving social problems. As argued by Panofsky, an ‘intellectual
debate was tied up in conflicting social visions of behaviour genetics as a
field’ (p. 15).
The analysis of ‘conflicting visions’ (Lösch et al., 2018) is an approach in the
sociology of expectations in which researchers examine how the future is used
to ‘marshal resources, coordinate activities, and manage uncertainty’ (Brown
and Michael, 2003, p. 4) in the pursuit of present agendas (Van Lente and
Rip, 1998; Borup et al., 2006). Similar to expectations, anticipations,
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imaginaries, and promises, visions ‘articulate possibilities of what the future
may hold’ (Hanson, 2011, p. 5) and ‘how life ought, or ought not, to be
lived’ (Jasanoff, 2015, p. 4).
Research on visions emphasises that debates among scientists and engineers
may have a moral and political overlay because they are entangled with wider
societal visions (Lilliestam and Hanger, 2016). For instance, contested narra-
tives of nanotechnology are structured around an emerging set of visions.
Visions and counter-visions of, among others, the future conduct of warfare,
future transportation systems, and future social life shape nanotechnology’s
research trajectories (Kearnes and Macnaghten, 2006). Nelkin (1995) concludes
from her analysis of interactional controversies that ‘conflicting visions pre-
clude closure’ (p. 445) – an observation that is equally relevant for internalist
controversies. In his critical review of the proceedings and conclusions of the
Hastings Center’s Closure Project, Collins (1988) points out that ‘even in the
most unapplied regions of the physical sciences, experiment and scientific
method are not sufficient to effect a closure if people care enough about the
subject of the debate’ (p. 48).
Productivity
Research in the sociology of expectations indicates that conflicting visions can
result in ‘productive clashes’ that are ‘drivers of socio-technical change’ (Lösch
and Hausstein, 2018). Along these lines, scholars in STS and philosophy of
science claim that controversy is productive for research and development in
at least three ways. First, controversy is a driver of change giving rise to emer-
ging science and technology (Martin, 2014; Delborne, 2015; Williams, 2019). As
vigorous, free debate allows for the destabilisation of hegemonic systems, it is
vital to unorthodox knowledge production and the development of novel tech-
nologies (Williams, 2019, citing Hård, 1993; Barthe et al., 2020).
Second, recent work in philosophy of science by Kitcher, Longino, Solomon,
and others describes controversy as a condition for the democratisation of
knowledge and epistemological pluralism (King, Morgan-Olsen, and Wong,
2016). Contrary to most philosophers of science since Kuhn, they consider
dissent instead of consensus as the ordinary state of science because more
than one theory may be (partially) true (Solomon, 2001) and more than one
method may be appropriate for a specific problem (Williams, 2019). It is poten-
tially most productive for an academic community to pursue various paths of
inquiry simultaneously while scrutinising each line of research from multiple
vantage points.
Third, STS research highlights that controversy is profitable in terms of
financial revenue and academic output. Rosen (1993) stresses the link
between controversy, technological innovation, and economic benefits. To
make profits, companies ‘promote an incessant pursuit of technological
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innovation that opposes the concept of stabilisation’ (p. 493) and leaves a tech-
nology in a ‘constant and irresolvable state of interpretive flexibility’ (p. 505). In
a similar vein, Panofsky (2015) shows how behaviour geneticists made contro-
versy ‘profitable’ for their and their opponents’ career-advancement (p. 140):
‘Cycles of claims and rebuttals generate grants, projects, data collection, presen-
tations, and publications – the practical activity of scientific careers’ (p. 163).
Controversy in behaviour genetics endured because it ‘kept the engines of
scientific productivity turning’ (p. 140). It can thus be in the interest of all par-
ticipants in a debate to keep controversy alive (cf. Segerstråle, 1986).
Methods
For developing my analytical perspective, a tripartite framework that combines
paradigm clash, conflicting visions, and productivity to explain the persistence of
controversy, I drew on abduction (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). A surpris-
ing research finding – enduring controversy in AESToR – gave rise to an infer-
ential process in which iterative movements between empirical data and theory
generated theoretical insights against the backdrop of existing theory. The
empirical analysis below shows how the theoretical framework applies to the
controversy in AESToR. This analysis starts from data collected on the basis
of three complementary qualitative strategies: participant observation, qualitat-
ive interviews, and examination of scientific literature.
I conducted participant observation during three AESToR workshops in
Germany: ‘Methodology in Aesthetics of Religion’ in 2017, November 10–12;
‘Handbook Cultural and Cognitive Aesthetics of Religion’ in 2018, May 31–
June 3; ‘Aesthetics-Times-Religion’ in 2019, September 2–3. Furthermore, I
participated in two open panels organised by AESToR at the 33rd Biannual
Conference of the German Association for the Study of Religion (DVRW) in
2019, September 3–6. My field notes comprise detailed annotations taken
during presentations and discussions as well as notes about my interactions
with participants.
The workshops I attended involved some 20 participants on average.
Although AESToR includes officially 15 members who received funding from
the German Research Fund, about 15 additional self-funded scholars are also
part of the network and try to join meetings regularly. This number is an
approximation because the wider circle of the network is not a fixed group; fre-
quently new members join and old members take a step back. I selected inter-
viewees from both the inner group and its wider circle by means of snowball
sampling. The interviews, which were conducted in German, took place
between February and July 2018. I addressed the following themes during the
interviews: individual involvement in the AESToR network, controversial dis-
cussions in AESToR, relations between the aesthetics of religion and CSR, and
the future of the aesthetics of religion.
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In addition, I examined a number of relevant AESToR publications. During
the three-year funding period of the network, members worked on three
volumes (Grieser and Johnston, 2017a; Koch and Wilkens, 2019a; Johannson,
Kirsch, and Kreinath, 2020). They had published together before, as AESToR
emerged from the self-funded German working group Arbeitskreis Religion-
sästhetik, which has sought to institutionalise the aesthetics of religion since
2007. I examined volumes published by this working group as well as articles
and books written by individual members.3 The study of documents served
to contextualise AESToR, develop interview questions, and enrich the analysis.
For this article, I translated the quotations from German documents and inter-
views into English. I did not include references to individual interviewees to
protect the anonymity of AESToR members.
In several respects, my data collection and the analysis were informed by a
symmetrical approach (Bloor, 1991[1976]); in other respects, they became
asymmetrical. In line with the symmetrical tradition, I do not take a position
on how the aesthetics of religion should relate to CSR. However, my affiliation
with Prof. Dr. Anne Koch, who is well-acquainted with CSR literature and has
experience in collaboration with a medical researcher, may have had repercus-
sions on my data collection and interpretation. Upon Koch’s invitation, I con-
tributed a review essay on CSR to a special issue on the aesthetics of religion in a
German review journal (Smolka, 2019a), which may have prompted AESToR
members to consider me as a promoter of CSR. Moreover, Koch asked me to
present my preliminary research findings on AESToR in one of the network’s
DVRW panels (Smolka, 2019b). Because my conference contribution followed
from a request by the panel organisers, while controversial discussions had in
fact started several days before my presentation, it is possible that my presen-
tation stoked a fire that was already burning.
Whether the fire will keep on burning, or, in other words, whether contro-
versy in AESToR will persist beyond the period during which I followed the
network, is an empirical question. It may be the case that AESToR is still in
a state of controversy, and that at some point closure will be reached after
all. At that point it would be possible to pursue an analysis aimed at under-
standing the nature of the closure of debate. One possible drawback of
looking at a controversy in hindsight, however, is that particular tensions or
details from discussions may no longer be adequately remembered by actors
or have become difficult to identify in official records. In his analysis of the
social construction of the mountain bike, for instance, Rosen (1993) cannot dis-
count the possibility that the design of mountain bikes will eventually stabilise.
At the same time, greater distance, as he observes, ‘will always make an artefact
look more stable’ (p. 506). To avoid this potential drawback, I studied contro-
versy in AESToR as it unfolded and focus my analysis on a recent period of data
collection (2017–2020). Rather than discussing events chronologically, I present
them in a structured fashion in three analytical sections, each one covering one
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component of the tripartite analytical framework as it applies to the empirical
material.
1. Kulturwissenschaft versus Naturwissenschaft
More than thirty years ago, Cancik and Mohr (1988) introduced Religionsästhe-
tik as a sub-discipline of religious studies. Since then, various German scholars
have re-introduced Religionsästhetik or aesthetics of religion – the English
translation has been used more frequently since the establishment of
AESToR – as an ‘approach’ (Kreinath, 2004, p. 100), a ‘new field of research’
(Wilke, 2008, p. 206), a ‘sub-discipline’ (Guggenmos, 2012, p. 268), and even
as the ‘leading discipline’ (Mohn, 2004, p. 300) of religious studies. The
terms ‘discipline’ and ‘field’mark academic territory and separate the aesthetics
of religion from earlier text-centric and phenomenological approaches to the
study of religion. Whereas text-centric approaches look for religious revelations
in sacred books, phenomenological approaches consider religion as a decontex-
tualised experience sui generis. The aesthetics of religion, by contrast, is based
on the assumption that religions are cultural constructs which are conditioned
on their historical, social, and cultural contexts (Wilke, 2008, p. 209).
As the aesthetic dimension of religion is assumed to happen in ‘cultural pat-
terns’ (Koch and Wilkens, 2019b, p. 1), scholars in the aesthetics of religion
pursue a cultural approach to the study of religion. They consider their field
as a Kulturwissenschaft (Münster, 2001; Lanwerd, 2002; Mohn, 2004), which
must be distinguished from the American and British cultural studies. While
cultural studies are politically motivated (analyses of power dynamics are sup-
posed to serve as resources for resistance), the German Kulturwissenschaften
pursue an epistemological project (Musner, 2001). Kulturwissenschaften
emerged as an interdisciplinary field that informed a cultural turn in the huma-
nities to mitigate the increasing fragmentation of academic disciplines in post-
war Germany (Böhme et al., 2007). The aesthetics of religion are thus of
German origin, but scholars have made stronger efforts to gain international
visibility since the launch of AESToR.
AESToR member Guggenmos (2012) describes CSR as the Anglo-American
cognitive science counterpart to the German aesthetics of religion. CSR is an
academic field with institutional grounding both in Europe and in North
America. It draws on theories and methods from the cognitive sciences to
explain mental processes and underlying recurrent patterns of religious
thought and behaviour (Xygalatas, 2014). After an initial decade of laying
theoretical foundations, CSR turned towards empirical hypothesis testing.
According to some of CSR’s founding fathers, ‘[t]he cognitive sciences now
offer an empirical, experimentally based paradigm for the study of religion’
(Martin and Wiebe, 2012, p. 592), which sets CSR on a ‘truly scientific
footing’ (Whitehouse, 2017, p. 47).
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CSR as a Naturwissenschaft and the aesthetics of religion as a Kulturwis-
senschaft clashed when CSR researcher Sørensen gave a keynote lecture on cog-
nitive processing of rituals during an AESToR workshop in June 2018. The
editors of AESToR’s handbook had invited Sørensen to join the workshop
and to contribute a chapter to their handbook. They hoped that this invitation
would help to better integrate CSR in the handbook. However, some of their
colleagues’ reactions to Sørensen’s keynote lecture suggest exactly the opposite:
it only enhanced the rift between the two paradigms.
Experiment on Cognitive Processing of Rituals
In his keynote lecture ‘Ritual and Ritualized Behaviour’ (2018), Sørensen pre-
sented an experiment on how ritual participation is cognitively processed.
The experiment was conducted by an interdisciplinary research team and
resulted in two publications on which Sørensen based his lecture (Nielbo and
Sørensen, 2011; Schjødt et al., 2013). In this study, cognitive processing is
defined according to the predictive processing model of the brain. The brain
is modelled as a prediction machine that produces predictions about the
world, which are continuously compared with and updated in response to
sensory input. During a ritual, operationalised as a non-functional action
sequence, prediction error occurs frequently because a ritual is deprived of
an obvious goal and of causal links between individual actions. As constant pre-
diction error monitoring generates high attentional demands, ritual partici-
pants need to be highly concentrated during the entire ritual to execute it
properly.
To test whether a ritual indeed generates high attentional demands, an
experiment was developed in which undergraduate students segmented
filmed action sequences into action units by means of a response button.
The task was performed for two action sequences (Figure 1): one was func-
tional (i.e. actions were causally related and exhibited a goal) and the other
was non-functional (i.e. actions were not causally related and a goal was
not apparent). When watching the non-functional action sequence, students
Figure 1. Ritual/non-ritual condition in an experiment on cognitive processing of rituals; pres-
entation slide (Sørensen, 2018, p. 22, © Kristoffer L. Nielbo).
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pressed the response button more often than in the case of the functional
action sequence (Figure 2). According to Sørensen and colleagues, this
result suggests that segmenting a non-functional action sequence into
action units creates higher attentional demands compared to the segmenta-
tion of a functional action sequence. When students watched the same non-
functional action sequence several times, the number of button presses
remained chronically high. The researchers draw the conclusion that
rituals, even when practised on a regular basis, have high attentional
demands, which explains why ritual participants have barely any cognitive
resources left to understand and memorise the event. As a result, prior
expectations and interpretations often provided by religious authorities
may become more important for participants’ understanding of the ritual
than their perception of the event.
Figure 2. Graphical representation of experimental results; presentation slide (Sørensen, 2018,
p. 21, © Kristoffer L. Nielbo).
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Critical Responses to the Experimental Study of Rituals
In response to Sørensen’s presentation of an experimental study of rituals,
AESToR members raised three critical issues. First, some AESToR members
were surprised that Sørensen and his colleagues drew conclusions about how
ritual participants interpret a ritual event without taking first-person experience
of participants into account. An AESToR member asked in an interview:
Why is the experience of those exercising [the ritual] not taken seriously? He
[Sørensen] says that the ritual practitioner cannot process it fast enough, but
maybe the practitioner knows much better what is happening and what he is
doing…My methodological paradigm always centres on what people experience
with whom I work, not on what I experience.
The interviewee added that one needs ‘to take more seriously what people say,
rather than their performance in cognitive tasks.’
Second, AESToR members questioned the definition of a ritual as a non-
functional action sequence. According to some members, what counts as a
ritual depends on the particular context in which a ritual takes place and on
whether practitioners consider their actions as a ritual. There is no ‘universal
category’ which defines a ritual.
Third, AESToR members doubted that experimental results generated in a
laboratory setting were applicable to real-world contexts. An AESToR
member who conducted historical research on African healing rituals was scep-
tical about whether results from a laboratory study with Western undergradu-
ate students could be applied to religious healing rituals in Tanzania. Another
AESToR member expanded this critique:
The laboratory situation changes the complete experience. The measurement instru-
ment influences experience and its cognitive processing. Imagine you say something
in an fMRI scanner. It is all very artificial. The brain works differently in a real-life
situation than in the laboratory. There are fundamental differences between the lab-
oratory and field research.
In sum, AESToR members criticised the experiment’s focus on behavioural
measurements rather than subjective experience, the search for universally
applicable categories instead of contextual specification, and the difference
between laboratory and natural settings. These remarks indicate that the aes-
thetics of religion and CSR are different research paradigms with distinct epis-
temological, ontological, and methodological underpinnings. The disagreement
about philosophical assumptions of inquiry classifies as a controversy of prin-
ciple (Table 1). According to McMullin (1987), the resolution of controversies
of principle ‘is slow, and oblique’ (p. 75) because fundamental assumptions are
not likely to change. This explains the persistence of one side of the controversy
in AESToR. The paradigm clash between Kulturwissenschaft and Naturwis-
senschaft explains why some AESToR members are sceptical about the
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combination of cognitive and cultural approaches. It does not explain, however,
why other AESToR members work with cognitive theory and think that scho-
lars in the aesthetics of religion should engage with literature from CSR.
2. Conflicting Visions of the Relation Between the Aesthetics of
Religion and the Cognitive Science of Religion
The call for engaging with CSR literature was raised repeatedly at the AESToR
workshop in November 2017. During the workshop, a proposal for the Hand-
book of Cognitive and Cultural Aesthetics of Religion written by the handbook
editors circulated among AESToR members, and the editors announced that
the publisher Bloomsbury was in favour of including ‘cognitive’ in the hand-
book title. The proposal suggests that handbook contributions would reference
‘the state of the art in the cognitive study of religion.’ One of the editors
explained in an interview that the ‘cognitive study of religion’ is an umbrella
term for cognitive approaches to the study of religion, among which CSR fea-
tures prominently. Therefore, both names are used interchangeably and are
subsumed under the same acronym (Koch and Wilkens, 2019b, p. 6). The pro-
posal further promises: ‘The Handbook innovatively connects historical anthro-
pology and culture theories with the cognitive study of religion’ (emphasis in
original). What the handbook is supposed to do was a matter of conflict
among AESToR members.
In interviews and informal conversations, AESToRmembers mentioned that
they consider the handbook publication as a ‘political move’ to create an iden-
tity for the aesthetics of religion which facilitates the institutionalisation and
internationalisation of the field. Accordingly, an interviewee referred to the
handbook title as an ‘identity marker.’ She elaborated that a controversy over
the relation between cognitive and cultural approaches in the aesthetics of reli-
gion had tainted discussions in AESToR before the workshop in 2017.
However, the controversy did not start to boil until AESToR members
gained the impression that they had to identify with both the cultural and
the cognitive approach by including ‘cognitive’ in the handbook title.
Table 1. Paradigm clash in AESToR.
AESToR members’ comments on
Sørensen’s keynote lecture Naturwissenschaft Kulturwissenschaft
Controversy of
principle
Why are ritual participants not









There is no universal category that
defines a ritual since what counts








experiments are not applicable to
real-life contexts.
Laboratory experiments Natural settings Methodological
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Moreover, some were worried that by attaching the label ‘cognitive’ to a hand-
book arranged for classroom use, CSR and other cognitive research strands
would gain increasing importance in the aesthetics of religion in the future.
For this reason, an AESToR member left the network; she had envisioned a
different future for the aesthetics of religion.
Handbooks do not simply map which theories, methods, approaches, and
claims have reached consensus in an academic field; they also bring the field
into being in a particular form (Jasanoff et al., 1995). Therefore, writing a hand-
book was an occasion for AESToR to articulate visions of the future of the aes-
thetics of religion. Visions conflicted with each other as regards the relation
between the aesthetics of religion and CSR. From interviews and discussions
during AESToR workshops in 2017 and 2018, I distilled three themes – connec-
tivity, competence, and ethics – which each subsumes a pair of conflicting
visions. Through my analysis of these visions, I do not mean to suggest that dis-
cussions in AESToR were binary, taking place between two opposing camps.
Quite the opposite: some AESToR members claimed to occupy a middle pos-
ition. The articulation of visions and counter-visions, however, fuelled contro-
versial discussions in AESToR, and their juxtaposition per theme demonstrates
how they (re-)produced controversy in AESToR.
Connectivity
The title of the first AESToR volume ‘Aesthetics of Religion – a connective
concept’ condenses the vision that the aesthetics of religion ‘bring[s] together
the diverse expertise from within the Study of Religion and across the relevant
disciplines’ (Grieser and Johnston, 2017b, p. 32). The intention is to connect to
other ‘modes of academic knowledge’ (p. 30) by ‘paving the way to critically
engage diverse academic knowledge cultures – not least the polarised debate
on cognition and culture’ (p. 31). Although all AESToR members seemed to
agree with the vision of connectivity, some of them argued that connecting
to CSR was difficult, if not impossible.
Sceptics disliked how CSR researchers presented themselves and their work
during conferences. Some interviewees mentioned the 20th World Congress of
the International Association for the History of Religions in 2010. As one of
them reported:
[CSR pursued] an acquisition strategy… The claim seemed to be: ‘now we finally have
real science’ and that was very exclusive… It was connected to a demeanour that may
be more common in the natural sciences.
Several AESToR members shared the impression that CSR researchers
were ‘preaching’ cognitive theories as ‘universal truths’ and introduced
a scientistic ideology to religious studies that subordinated other
approaches.
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Competence
Some AESToRmembers worried that if studies in the aesthetics of religion neg-
lected the biological aspect of cognition, they would promote a simplified
understanding of cognition. They juxtaposed ‘new’ insights and models in
CSR with ‘outdated’ phenomenological theories, and emphasised that
AESToR would ‘look ridiculous’ if members continued conceptualising cogni-
tion and sensory perception with the latter. One member added that in religious
studies,
religion is usually referred to as dealing with a super-empirical reality, a reality that
cannot be perceived with the five senses. However, religious studies scholars barely
discuss what it means to perceive something with the senses. To answer this question,
we need cognitive-cultural studies.
The vision that AESToR members could learn from theories and experimental
results in CSR met with resistance from other AESToR members who did not
feel capable of mastering CSR literature in addition to their usual workload.
Some explained that trying to read CSR literature was like ‘learning another
language’ due to the usage of cognitive science jargon. Another AESToR
member pointed at norms and standards hidden in experimental research
that a humanities scholar might not be able to detect, let alone assess critically:
[R]esults in the natural sciences find expression in data and data is translated into
curves or graphics… There is always the question of what is the norm and what is
divergent. As a scholar of religious studies, I would have to rely on my partner
from the natural sciences for explaining what is normal and what is divergent.
AESToR members expressed unease about including experimental results from
CSR research in their own work because they did not undergo training in exper-
imental research and lacked competence to examine assumptions and designs
of experiments.
Ethics
An AESToR member promoted collaborations with CSR and medical research-
ers on ethical grounds. As ‘the humanities have suffered from an enormous
pressure to justify themselves’ in the last fifteen years, research on human
and cultural phenomena, religions in particular, could be valorised by means
of interdisciplinary research. Findings on positive effects of religious practices
and beliefs, such as health benefits, could foster the translational potential of
research on religions. For example, AESToR member Koch collaborated with
a physician to study subjective and psychophysiological changes during a
healing ritual. The described aim was to understand which ritual practices
and corresponding biological mechanisms predict well-being of ritual partici-
pants (Meissner and Koch, 2015). Conversely, another AESToR member
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rejected CSR research because he regarded it as ‘unethical.’ He considered the
negligence of first-person experience in the study of religious beliefs and prac-
tices as an instrumentalisation and objectification of human subjects.
3. Controversy Generates Academic Productivity in AESToR
Although conflicting visions continued to surface in discussions, it seemed as
though proponents of CSR outvoted sceptics during the AESToR workshop
in 2018. With the invitation of CSR researcher Sørensen to participate in the
workshop and to contribute to AESToR’s handbook, the incorporation of
other handbook chapters drawing on CSR, and the inclusion of the qualifier
‘cognitive’ in the final version of the handbook title, the controversy seemed
to end. After debates surrounding the handbook got settled, however, it was
in the interest of AESToR members to prolong the controversy for the sake
of epistemological pluralism and academic output.
Academic Output
For the public launch of the handbook at the DVRW 2019 conference, a major
meeting point for religious studies scholars in Germany, AESToR members put
controversy on the agenda again. In the book of abstracts for conference atten-
dees, their panel is described as follows (Koch and Guggenmos, 2019b, p. 30):
After a brief introduction to the new Bloomsbury Handbook of Cognitive and Cul-
tural Aesthetics of Religion (Katharina Wilkens & Anne Koch), Mareike Smolka
will present her study of debates within the research network AESToR.net,
which she has conducted as participant observer. This rare and valuable oppor-
tunity to reflect on the role of visions and conflicting paradigms for academic
knowledge production shall stimulate the discussion about blind spots, but also
about opportunities to sharpen arguments and develop the approach further. In
response to this presentation, Alexandra Grieser will discuss existing debates on
the critique of the body/mind dichotomy, and proposals to bridge natural and
cultural scientific knowledge in order to identify conceptual candidates for the
theorisation of religion in a connective framework. The overall focus of the
panel is that of the conference: how different approaches may contribute to a
conceptualisation of religion that keeps up with an appropriate theory of knowl-
edge for the Cultural Study of Religion. We hope for a lively debate opened up
by a short response by Arianna Borrelli.
The invitation of an STS scholar to present a sociological perspective on
‘debates within the research network AESToR.net,’ its pitch against two
responses from AESToR members, and panel organisers’ ‘hope for a lively
debate’ in the panel discussion – this framing would rather contribute to sus-
taining the controversy than ending it.
In fact, controversy had already started several days before the panel took
place. Panel contributors had shared written accounts of their conference
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presentations with each other, and this sparked a vexed e-mail exchange. It was
up for discussion whether scholars in the aesthetics of religion had lapsed into
natural science ebullience, or, in other words, an uncritical embracement of
experimental results and theoretical claims from the cognitive sciences as
unequivocal, true statements (Fitzgerald and Callard, 2014). The discussion
fed into the conference panel, which attracted a relatively large audience:
most seats in one of the lecture halls of Leibniz University Hannover were occu-
pied by around 40 religious studies scholars. After the panel, an AESToR
member announced to her colleagues over dinner that a paper based on partici-
pant observation of religious studies scholars had been presented at a religious
studies conference for the first time. She proudly added: ‘Scholars in the aes-
thetics of religion are once again brave enough to do things differently. This
brought new impetus for debate.’ And it also produced academic output and
attracted attention.
Research in the genre of controversy studies has shown that controversies are
fought out in academic publications, at conferences, and even in the media and
popular science writing (Cassidy, 2006). A central task in a controversy is to
convince audiences of the legitimacy of one’s position, and academics therefore
use different lines of communications to bring their point across (Sismondo,
2010). Some try to strengthen their persuasiveness by burying their opponents
under piles of articles (Panofsky, 2015). What seems like a mass of academic
output in the heat of a controversy, however, is cut in half as soon as a contro-
versy ends because half of the mass is based on discarded ideas. In retrospect,
academic output seems low during a controversy and much higher afterwards
when consensus allows for coordinated scientific work. In this case, however, as
long as the debate in AESToR persists, all scholarly work – whether it embraces
or condemns CSR – remains en vogue. As engaging in debate boosts academic
productivity, the participants have ample motivation to prolong the
controversy.
Epistemological Pluralism
Another way in which controversy contributed to academic productivity in
AESToR is epistemological pluralism. According to King et al.’s (2016)
reading of Longino and Kitcher’s democratic approach to knowledge, epis-
temological pluralism in a community of researchers can be productive if
there is serious ‘uptake’ in debates (p. 72). Researchers must seriously engage
with another position giving it equal consideration and weight as one’s own.
Such an engagement can be productive in the sense that it clarifies sources of
disagreement, raises awareness of what has so far been taken for granted, and
introduces new directions of inquiry.
An example of productive uptake relates to the university teaching of an
AESToR member. He designed a student assignment for a university course
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on ‘Cognitive Cultural Studies.’ The assignment asks students to write an
account of CSR and to demonstrate their ‘understanding of the theoretical
foundations, spectrum, and implications of the cognitive approach’ by
‘approaching it from a critical position, or contrasting it to classical approaches
to the study of culture and religion.’
Similarly, the handbook chapter on ‘Aesthetics of the Spirits’ (Bräunlein,
2019) engages with CSR literature by analysing the experience of spirits and
ghosts through two different lenses: anthropological approaches to the body,
senses, and emotion, and CSR. As Bräunlein concludes from his analysis
(p. 282):
Such explanations [in CSR] are helpful for understanding the aesthetics of spirits in a
very general sense. However, to explore aesthetic complexities within the multifaceted
spiritscapes around the globe, anthropological approaches to studying the body, the
senses, and emotion are more productive.
He makes explicit that both approaches produce different kinds of knowledge,
emphasising that anthropological approaches are more suitable to answer the
questions that interest him (how human beings perceive ghosts, rather than
why they perceive ghosts). By comparing and contrasting cognitive and cultural
approaches, he carves out the epistemological underpinnings and relevance of
his cultural approach. His account illustrates that epistemological pluralism and
disagreement in a scholarly network provide resources for critically rethinking
and, thereby, strengthening one’s own position.
Conclusion
This article takes a surprising observation – an ongoing controversy over the
relation between cognitive and cultural approaches to the study of religion –
as a starting point to develop an analytical framework that helps explain the per-
sistence of controversy. Drawing on the philosophy of science, sociology of
expectations, and STS, the framework combines three perspectives to analyse
the persistence of controversy in the research network AESToR: paradigm
clash, conflicting visions, and productivity. The analysis highlights the interde-
pendence of competing paradigms and conflicting visions. The notion that Kul-
turwissenschaft and Naturwissenschaft would exclude each other in this context
is not solely a matter of their intellectual structure, because several AESToR
members seek connectivity between the two. At the same time, visions about
the future of the aesthetics of religion are informed by more fundamental
assumptions, following from the paradigm in which academics are trained.
Finally, the analysis shows that keeping a controversy alive can be in the interest
of all parties involved. Enduring controversy allows participants to probe the
limitations of their own position in critical interactions while generating aca-
demic output in the form of presentations and rebuttals.
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This analysis makes two scholarly contributions. First, by shedding light on
why controversy persists in a scholarly network, it contributes to the genre of
internalist controversy studies. Such studies have focused on the analysis of
closure mechanisms in a core-set of experts who are described as eager to
leave disputes fairly quickly (Collins, 1981; Collins, 1985; Jasanoff, 2017).
Studies of interactional controversies, by contrast, have paid greater attention
to what makes debates with multiple stakeholders persist (Beder, 1991;
Nelkin, 1992; Gottweis, 1995). In debates with multiple stakeholders ‘where
moral principles are at stake, efforts to negotiate and compromise may fail to
sway those who are committed to a cause’ (Nelkin, 1995, p. 454). The study
of AESToR shows that similar dynamics can be observed in internalist contro-
versies. Even within a scholarly network, conflicts between larger views on mor-
ality (ethics of empirical research) and epistemology (clash versus connectivity
of paradigms) reproduce controversy (cf. Segerstråle, 1986).
Second, this study further develops Panofsky’s (2015) concept of ‘misbehav-
ing science’ – an enduring state of controversy where norms and standards
remain ambiguous. Panofsky concludes his analyses of persistent controversy
in behaviour genetics with a paragraph on ‘knowledge in shackles’ (p. 240).
He explains that ongoing controversy has played a role in the fragmentation
of the field which, in turn, stifled knowledge production: ‘we can assert that
misbehaving science has restricted what might be known about genes and
behaviour’ (p. 241). Controversy in AESToR, by contrast, has not dissolved
the network; instead, it has been conducive to a pluralist advancement of
knowledge (cf. Williams, 2019)
One interpretation of this observation is that controversy in a cohesive social
group may be more likely to result in epistemological pluralism rather than
fragmentation. AESToR members share a historical narrative which serves as
reference point for the socialisation of new members (Mohn, 2004; Wilke,
2008). Scholars at different career stages have joined the network, and those
with more secured positions and resources have provided the structural con-
ditions for collaborations, such as venues for annual meetings. Applying the
concept of ‘misbehaving science’ to a core-group rather than a core-
set allows us to think of incessant controversy as a way to stimulate productive
encounters between different kinds of knowledge.
Moreover, the analysis of controversy in AESToR warrants the expansion of
the concept of ‘misbehaving science’ to interdisciplinary engagements between
the humanities and the cognitive sciences (Littlefield and Johnson, 2012;
Callard and Fitzgerald, 2015). Such encounters have been described by con-
cepts, such as ‘critical friendship’ (Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013, p. 80) and
‘experimental entanglements’ (Fitzgerald and Callard, 2014). These concepts
denote ‘friendly’ modes of joint epistemic work across the cognition-culture
divide. The analysis of AESToR suggests that controversy is an alternative
mode which may not be as ‘friendly’ but equally productive. If misbehaving
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science involves humanities scholars for whom critical interactions and the
search for the strongest argument are central to academic work, controversy
may give impetus for new inquiries.
Notes
1. Jasanoff’s ‘internalist’ and ‘interactional’ controversy studies must not be confused
with ‘internalist’ and ‘externalist’ historiographies of scientific knowledge (Sismondo
2010, p. 50). The latter terminology refers to explanations of scientific knowledge
focusing on intellectual and social forces internal to an expert community versus
those that draw on broader social structures extending beyond the community.
2. Examples of enduring controversies were studied in fetal research by Maynard-
Moody, surrogate motherhood by Taub, and HIV testing by Guttmacher – all pub-
lished in Nelkin (1992).
3. For an overview of publications from the working group Arbeitskreis Religionsästhetik
and individual publications from its members, see: http://www.religionsaesthetik.de/
2018/01/01/literatur/
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